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█ Abstract Moral cognition research has in part been taken to be a problem for moral sentimentalists, who 
claim that emotions are sensitive to moral information. In particular, Joshua Greene can be understood to pro-
vide an argument against moral sentimentalism on the basis of neuropsychological evidence. In his argument 
he claims that emotions are an unreliable source of moral insight. However, the argument boils down to circu-
lar claims: (1) Rationalistic factors are assumed to be the only morally relevant factors; (2) Emotions are not 
sensitive to these factors; (3) Thus, Moral Sentimentalism is false, because only rationalistic factors are justified. 
While this circularity makes so-called sourcing-arguments fallacious if applied against moral sentimentalism, 
moral cognition research has much to contribute. Indeed, moral cognition research will be instrumental for 
clarifying the sentimentalist position, shedding light on the mental mechanics underlying emotional moral pro-
cessing. After all, evidence from moral cognition points to substantial involvement of affective processes in 
human moral cognizing and their embodied nature; thus, challenging long held beliefs about morality. 
KEYWORDS: Moral Cognition; Moral Sentimentalism; Emotions; Embodied Cognition; Moral Brain 
 
█ Riassunto Emozioni, Esperimenti e il cervello morale. L’errore degli argomenti basati sulla cognizione morale con-
tro il sentimentalismo morale – Si è spesso ritenuto che la ricerca nell’ambito della cognizione morale costituisse, 
almeno in parte, un problema per il sentimentalismo morale, il quale sostiene che le emozioni sono sensibili 
all’informazione morale. In particolare, si può pensare che Joshua Greene abbia portato un argomento contro il 
sentimentalismo morale basato su evidenza neuropsicologica. Secondo il suo argomento le emozioni non costi-
tuiscono una fonte affidabile di comprensione morale. E tuttavia questo argomento fa leva su una circolarità: 
(1) gli unici fattori qualificati come moralmente rilevanti sono quelli razionali; (2) le emozioni non sono sensibi-
li a questi fattori; (3) pertanto, considerato che solo i fattori razionali sono giustificati, il sentimentalismo mora-
le è falso. Tale circolarità rende fallaci i cosiddetti argomenti sorgente, laddove questi siano applicati al senti-
mentalismo morale. Al contempo, la ricerca sulla cognizione morale ha molto da dire su questo argomento per-
ché può contribuire a chiarire la posizione sentimentalista, gettando luce sulla meccanica mentale sottostante i 
processi morali che fanno leva su emozioni. Anzi questa prospettiva di ricerca evidenzia che i processi di carat-
tere affettivo sono coinvolti in maniera sostanziale nella cognizione morale umana e hanno una natura incarna-
ta; in questo modo essa mette in discussione convinzioni di vecchia data sulla morale. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Cognizione morale; Sentimentalismo morale; Emozioni; Cognizione incarnata; Cervello 
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IN THE LAST DECADE, MORAL cognition re-
search has made some inroads into main-
stream philosophy. This ambitious interdis-
ciplinary project aims to understand the cog-
nitive processes involved in human cognizing 
in morally challenging situations. Under-
standing these mental processes has wide 
ranging philosophical implications. Philoso-
phers have speculated for a long time about 
the workings of moral judgments, beliefs, 
emotions, motivation, etc. with profound 
implications for their philosophical work. 
Theorizing about what it means to live a vir-
tuous life, to be a good person, and to make 
the right decisions can be enriched by scien-
tifically accurate empirical accounts of the 
mental mechanics speculated about.  
At times, however, moral cognition re-
searchers have even more ambitious goals. 
Not satisfied by merely settling empirical 
claims, they attempt to settle normative 
claims. These claims have traditionally be-
longed solely to the domain of philosophical 
inquiry – but at the moment, in the advent of 
experimental philosophy, attempts are being 
made to settle normative disputes on the ba-
sis of experimental insight. One of the dis-
putes picked up by the field focuses on the 
role of emotions in moral cognizing: the 
long-standing disagreement between ration-
alists and moral sentimentalists on whether 
emotions pick up on morally relevant facts. 
This debate goes back to at least Kant and 
Hume, who disagreed about whether senti-
ment or reason is the dominant force of the 
moral mind.1 More recently some work in 
moral cognition has been taken to be a prob-
lem for moral sentimentalists, e.g., Kauppinen 
stressed that: «[…] Greene makes a plausible 
case that some emotional processes are sensi-
tive to morally irrelevant factors […]».2 
 Joshua Greene should be acknowledged 
as the most substantial contributor to the 
field of moral cognition.3 Certainly, his work 
has implications for moral sentimentalists, 
though he is mainly concerned with the en-
trenched debate between deontology and 
utilitarianism. He argues that intuitions sup-
porting deontology are merely emotional re-
sponses, which do not provide valid epistem-
ic access to moral facts. He constructs this 
argument by experimentally linking intui-
tions supporting deontology to emotional re-
sponses and at the same time assailing the 
validity of moral sentimentalism. His argu-
ment boils down to this: moral emotional re-
sponses are prone to biases and the source of 
deontological intuitions are such biased emo-
tional responses. Thus, he argues, deontolog-
ical intuitions should not be considered mor-
ally valid intuitions, because they  ironically 
are a result of biased emotional responses. 
This argument, which draws on a large 
body of psychological and neuroscientific re-
search, has attracted a lot of attention. It 
provides a forceful attack on the position of 
moral sentimentalists, who claim that emo-
tions inform and motivate  ethical decisions. 
Subsequently, many authors have articulated 
criticism of Greene’s and related arguments 
by trying to disprove specific argumentative 
steps.4 However, it is my contention that 
Greene provides a fallacious argument to 
begin with. As such, the correctness of single 
premises should be of secondary interest, as 
the argument presented by Greene is circular. 
The argument assumes a principle about what 
is the normatively correct outcome of a deci-
sion problem, on the basis of which factors 
should be considered. Through this principle 
normativity is imbued into cognitive processes, 
which, in turn, is used to derive normative con-
clusions. However, the conclusions settle nor-
mative questions, which tacitly have already 
been decided by the starting assumption of the 
normative principle. 
Moral cognition research, however, has 
other – less ambitious – arguments to offer 
that have implications for moral sentimental-
ism. These arguments are non-circular, be-
cause they do not rely on a normative first 
principle, but point towards inconsistencies 
between normative assertions of theories and 
the empirical stipulations going along with 
them. Such arguments are defensible and 
have already had a lasting effect on philo-
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sophical discourse, demonstrating the value 
of philosophical work informed by moral 
cognition research. Moral sentimentalists 
should, in the end, be encouraged to embrace 
moral cognition research. The insights 
gained are useful to clarify sentimentalist po-
sitions and, more often than not, point to 
substantial involvement of emotional pro-
cesses in moral processing5 – one of the core 
beliefs of every sentimentalist. 
 
█  Setting the Stage 
 
Moral cognition research is a fairly recent 
development and the new breed of argu-
ments created are still in a trial phase. The 
complexity of this interdisciplinary endeavor 
that draws from cognitive science and ethics 
often produces complex arguments. It is first 
of all instructive to distinguish two research 
projects, though they are often pursued at the 
same time: (1) Experimental philosophy, a 
project that tries to settle philosophical de-
bates by constructing them into experimen-
tally testable forms and deriving philosophi-
cal conclusions from experimental results; (2) 
Moral cognitive-(neuro-)psychology, a pro-
ject investigating the nature of cognitive pro-
cesses involved in morally challenging tasks, 
i.e., moral decision-making, moral motiva-
tion, and moral perception. Often these pro-
jects are not suitably distinguished from one 
another and the complexity of the arguments 
obfuscates their content. The moral cognition 
aspect of such arguments generally takes form 
along the lines of the following premises: 
 
• Psychological or neuroscientific experi-
mental results suggest that neuropsycholog-
ical factors X and Y differ in their (moral) 
validity. 
• Intuitions6 that rely on factors X are valid 
and those relying on Y are invalid. 
 
These insights can then be put to work to 
settle debates in moral philosophy (thus deal-
ing with issues relating to experimental phi-
losophy). There are two ways to complete 
these arguments. Depending on which kind 
of completion for the argument is formulat-
ed, different kinds of arguments can be con-
structed: Fortification arguments, which aim 
to defend the validity of intuitions:7 
 
• Moral Theory M is supported by Intui-
tion I. 
• Intuition I relies on factor X.  
• Thus, the support for Moral Theory M by 
Intuition I is valid. 
 
Or alternatively,  debunking arguments, 
assailing the validity of an intuition: 
 
• Moral Theory M is supported by Intui-
tion I. 
• Intuition I relies on factor Y. 
• Thus, the support for Moral Theory M by 
Intuition I is invalid. 
 
The latter kind are of greater interest for 
moral sentimentalists,8 as these kinds of argu-
ments are often employed against sentimental-
ists to debunk their position,9 rather than by 
sentimentalists to fortify their position. 
In the following, a specific species of de-
bunking arguments shall be considered, 
which will be labeled sourcing arguments, i.e., 
arguments that purport the neuropsycholog-
ical source of intuitions to be the factor rele-
vant to the validity of these intuitions. These 
arguments assume that different kinds of 
cognitive processes produce different kinds 
of moral thought. These kinds of moral 
thought can be distinguished in terms of va-
lidity on the basis of characteristics of the 
cognitive systems producing this thought. 
Sourcing arguments can take the form of 
both debunking and fortification arguments. 
The concrete exemplary case is taken from 
Joshua Greene’s work. His work generally 
deals with universalist moral issues and heav-
ily utilizes trolley problems. He has contrib-
uted many arguments to the debates in moral 
cognition, which are sometimes difficult to 
keep apart due to similarities in their struc-
ture. The core of the argument at issue here 
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has most clearly been stated in Greene’s No 
Cognitive Miracles Principle:  
 
When we are dealing with unfamiliar 
moral problems, we ought to rely less on 
automatic settings (automatic emotional 
responses) and more on manual mode 
(conscious, controlled reasoning), lest we 
bank on cognitive miracles.10 
 
In a nutshell, this claim distinguishes cog-
nitive processes, one that reliably provides 
valid moral insight and one which does not. 
Thus, intuitions, thought, or responses 
sourced form one process should be trusted 
and relied upon and those from the other 
process should not. The argument Greene 
presents for this claim is complex and has 
been articulated in many different ways and 
with different purposes.11 Thus, in the fol-
lowing, his argument will be reconstructed to 
reveal its circularity when applied against the 
position of moral sentimentalism. The first 
step of reconstruction will be to put it in a 
general form: 
 
(I) If psychological process T1 (automatic-
emotional thinking) is the source of in-
sight, then this insight is unreliable and if 
psychological process T2 (controlled-
rational thinking) is the source of insight, 
then this insight is reliable. 
(II) The source of intuition I1 is T1 and the 
source of Intuition I2 is T2. 
(III Intuition I1 supports moral principle M1 
and Intuition I2 supports moral principle 
M2. 
(IV) Thus, the support of intuition I1 for prin-
ciple M1 can be considered unreliable, 
while the support of intuition I2 for prin-
ciple M2 can be considered reliable. 
 
There are two major steps in this argu-
ment: (1) Explicating a specific version of the  
dual-process view inherited from Kahneman, 
which makes premise (I) tenable;12 (2) The 
application of this view to moral disagree-
ments, i.e., empirical work showing that intu-
itions actually depend on the cognitive pro-
cess they are sourced from and philosophical 
work that shows these intuitions support 
moral theories. While many authors have ar-
gued against either of these steps in many 
ways, the cardinal sin of the argument, i.e., 
the circularity of this argument, is only re-
vealed by making the normative assumptions 
more explicit. In this paper, individual prem-
ises will not be treated overly critically, even 
though they might be questionable or worthy 
of deeper discussion, because its purpose is to 
investigate the overarching problem of the 
argument’s hidden circularity. To find this 
hidden element in Greene’s argument, the 
next section will give a brief overview of said 
argument and how it plays out. 
 
█  Greene, experimental philosophy and ex-
plicit normativity 
 
Greene’s sourcing-argument unfolds as 
follows: Greene shows experimentally that 
utilitarian intuitions are associated with dif-
ferent neural processes than deontological 
intuitions. He describes an episode with his 
early mentor Jonathan Cohen:13 Greene, 
since his days as a philosophy PhD student, 
had harbored the suspicion that moral 
judgements differ depending on whether 
they involve personal interactions or not. 
Cohen quickly connected this to different 
neuronal pathways, and thus a new fruitful 
interdisciplinary endeavor was born.  
In fMRI experiments, Greene and Cohen 
isolated the neural processes elicited in tasks 
that focus on the trolley problem, an influen-
tial thought experiment in normative eth-
ics.14 The thought experiment poses the ques-
tion whether one would sacrifice one person 
to save five others. In the version originally 
introduced by Foot,15 five railway workers 
are in the path of a runaway trolley (from 
which the experiment inherits its name). The 
question now is whether one would pull a 
lever to redirect the trolley to another track. 
The tricky morally relevant detail is that on 
this alternative track there is a single person 
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that would be hit by the trolley if one chooses 
to redirect it. The most significant alterna-
tive version of the problem was posed by 
Thomson.16 In her variation the five railway 
workers can be saved from the oncoming trol-
ley by pushing a large man from a footbridge 
onto the tracks. The body of the large man is 
heavy enough to stop the trolley, so that the 
lives of the five workers can be saved in ex-
change for sacrificing the large man. The inter-
esting feature of these trolley cases is that the 
different versions elicit different intuitions.  
The first case presented (the lever case) 
usually elicits the intuition that one should 
pull the lever. This intuition is in line with 
utilitarian normative demands and contrary 
to those deontological theories that purport 
that doing nothing is better than actively kill-
ing a person by pulling the lever. The second 
case (the footbridge case), however, usually 
elicits the intuition that pushing the large 
man in front of the trolley is wrong, even 
though it would save many lives. This is in 
tension with demands of most utilitarian 
theories, but this intuition is in line with de-
ontological considerations. This  research 
paradigm mirrors a professional philosopher 
conducting a thought experiment, that sup-
posedly gives them insight into the validity of 
a philosophical theory, depending on wheth-
er or not the state of affairs in the thought 
experiment is properly and plausibly ac-
counted for by the philosophical theory. Cor-
respondingly, the logic of experimental phi-
losophy takes experimentally established re-
sponses corresponding to claims derived 
from moral theories as support for this moral 
theory as such.17  
Greene’s fMRI studies show that intuitions 
in the lever case are associated with character-
istic activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC), an area associated with con-
trolled-rational processing.18 Based on this in-
sight, Greene says that we should place more 
importance on this intuition. The intuition in 
the footbridge case, however, is associated 
with activation in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC), an area associated with au-
tomatic-emotional processing and thus 
Greene discounts these intuitions. The reason 
why one cognitive process can be trusted and 
the other cannot is (ostensibly) provided by 
experimental work by Kahneman and others. 
This body of work is the source of the tacitly 
assumed normativity in this argument, as the 
following section will reveal. 
 
█  Kahneman, moral cognition and hidden 
normativity 
 
Kahneman famously investigated cogni-
tive biases and advanced a theory of two 
modes of cognition: a fast and a slow mode.19 
This theory and its many descendants are to-
day known as dual-process theories. The idea 
is simple: by means of many experiments, 
brain regions have been identified which are 
more and less involved in producing some 
“correct” behavior. These experiments re-
vealed that the fast processes were prone to be 
more involved in undesirable behavior, while 
the slow processes were usually responsible for 
the desired outcome. The labels “fast” and 
“slow” changed over time. The notion of a fast 
process took on emotional connotations: such 
as, subjective, heuristic, automatic, uncon-
scious. Slow processes, however, gained an air 
of infallibility and were given many rational-
istic labels: for example, controlled, flexible, 
objective, deliberate. Kahneman offers a very 
neutral terminology, calling fast processes 
“type 1 processes” and slow processes “type 2 
processes”. His more normative labels stuck, 
however, and the use of dual-process theories 
became normatively charged. The claim that 
type 2 processing (slow-controlled, i.e., ration-
al) is “good” (normatively correct) and type 1 
processing (fast-automatic, i.e., emotional) is 
“bad” is well rehearsed in dual-process accounts 
of cognition.20 
Evans brands this normative connotation 
fallacious and diagnoses it as an over-
generalization of classic experimental results: 
 
In the traditional paradigms, researchers 
presented participants with hard, novel 
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problems for which they lacked experience 
(students of logic being traditionally ex-
cluded), and also with cues that prompted 
type 1 [fast-automatic] processes to com-
pete or conflict with these correct answers. 
So in these paradigms, it does seem that 
type 2 [slow-controlled] processing is at 
least necessary to solve the problems, and 
that type 1 [fast-automatic] processes are 
often responsible for cognitive biases.21 
 
This means that the standard way to con-
duct these experiments leads to experimental 
setups in which only one sort of reasoning 
(controlled) can lead to correct responses, 
and other kinds of reasoning can only pro-
duce errors. Evans continues that in more re-
cent experimental work, in which a broader 
range of cognitive tasks is considered, both 
types of processing seem to be equally re-
sponsible for cognitive biases.22 
Evans shows that Kahneman’s insights are 
domain specific (at best) and if a more com-
prehensive domain of cognitive tasks is con-
sidered neither type 1 nor type 2 processing 
provides some sort of normative advantage. 
Thus, premise (I) is empirically inadequate 
and needs to be revised. Crucially, Greene’s 
argument assumes that processes T1 and T2 
are generally reliable or unreliable sources of 
insight. However, these processes appear to 
have limited flexibility and can thus only be 
considered reliable in a specific domain. 
These cognitive processes then turn out to be 
unreliable in different domains. This means 
that the experimental results are over-
generalized. I do not take this point to be a 
fatal flaw in the argument that cannot be 
remedied by adapting the argumentative 
structure. The argument from above, specifi-
cally premise (I), can be reformulated to ac-
count for this: 
 
(I*) In domain D, if psychological process 
T1 (type 1 automatic-emotional think-
ing) is the source of insight, then this in-
sight is unreliable and if psychological 
process T2 (controlled-rational think-
ing) is the source of insight, then this in-
sight is reliable. 
(D) Intuition I is only elicited in domain D. 
 
In this formulation of the argument, it 
depends on the truth of premise (D) whether 
the argument is overgeneralizing or not. 
There, however, is still another problem with 
premise (I*). Evans points to an implicit cor-
rectness criterion used to conduct the exper-
iments that establish the reliability of the dif-
ferent types of processing: «The problem is 
that a normative system is an externally im-
posed, philosophical criterion that can have 
no direct role in the psychological definition 
of a type 2 process».23 
Since this philosophical criterion has never 
been explicitly stated and has been implicitly 
used by a multitude of researchers, its foot-
print in the research is probably fuzzy, but 
nevertheless it has a distinctly rationalistic 
connotation. Experiments often take the form 
of logic puzzles «like assuming some dubious 
proposition to be true and deciding whether a 
conclusion necessarily follows from them». 24 
Kahneman’s examples to introduce the flaws 
of type 1 processes are all drawn from mathe-
matics or logic.25 These examples present 
problems that are supposed to reveal the flaws 
of fast processing: 
  
• A bat and ball cost $1.10. The bat costs 
one dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?  
• All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade 
quickly. Therefore, some roses fade 
quickly. Is this a valid inference? 
 
The quick response of many people, espe-
cially those untrained in these kinds of puz-
zles, will be wrong: Their first response may 
be that the ball costs 10 cents or that the con-
clusion of the second example can be inferred 
from the premises. In such logic puzzle ex-
periments the general truth of the axioms of 
classical logic is assumed and given the task 
this assumption is almost too trivial to men-
tion. But it is a normative criterion and the 
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triviality of applying it to these examples 
should not be taken to mean that it is a trivi-
ally true normative criterion. If moral philos-
ophy tells us anything, it is that there are no 
trivially true normative criteria. Consider the 
following experiment, where subjects get to 
know the fictional character Linda:  
 
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, out-
spoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination 
and social justice, and also participated in 
antinuclear demonstrations.26 
 
Then they are asked to evaluate the like-
lihood of a number of statements, two of 
which are: 
 
• Linda is a bank teller.  
• Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement.  
 
Most subjects rate the second statement 
as more likely, which is nonsense in terms of 
probability theory (conjunctions cannot be 
more likely than their conjuncts). This failure 
to exhibit the right behavior, i.e., to give the 
right answer, can be connected to fast pro-
cessing. But it cannot be said that the fast 
processing picked up on something meaning-
less here. Given the description of Linda, the 
second statement makes more sense, i.e., pre-
sents a more harmonious picture of a person. 
While it is clear that the fast response did not 
read the instructions carefully, it picked up on 
something.  
What is at issue here is first and foremost 
how normativity is imbued into a cognitive 
process. Can there be a better or worse process? 
It seems reasonable to accept that there 
are processes that are better or worse at do-
ing certain jobs, e.g., controlled processes are 
more likely to be involved in correctly solving 
logic puzzles in untrained subjects. But which 
job would a process need to be good at so 
that it can be considered a morally good pro-
cess? Furthermore, is there no potentially 
morally relevant job that fast processing is 
suited for? There are certainly philosophical 
issues in question here that cannot be settled 
on merely empirical grounds. Those philo-
sophical issues are precisely the normative 
issues that the sourcing argument tries to set-
tle. Some normative theories will postulate 
that the relevant job is to follow the demands 
of the principle of utility, other normative 
theories posit sensitivity to different features 
in the world to be the relevant job. Whether a 
process is good or bad is settled based on 
whether it does the relevant job. Whether the 
job is the relevant one depends on its sensi-
tivity to morally relevant factors, which in 
turn depends on which normative theory is 
endorsed – an issue that needs to be settled 
on philosophical grounds. Thus, to impose a 
normative criterion on cognitive processes is 
primarily a philosophical endeavor. To pro-
vide examples (i.e., experimental evidence) 
which show that a certain process is good at a 
certain job says nothing about whether this is 
the morally relevant job. This means that the 
correctness of any premise establishing the 
reliability of a cognitive process involved in 
moral cognition depends on which ethical 
theory is favored, the precise question sourc-
ing arguments purport to settle. 
Certainly, it is convincing that automatic 
processes of untrained subjects are prone to 
biases in solving logical puzzles, as, apparent-
ly, they are prone to pick up on other features 
of the world. But it is an entirely different 
question whether this a morally relevant job. 
Moral rationalists liken the truths of morality 
to those of mathematics and logic: according 
to them, they are a priori truths. Thus, they 
consider the cognitive task of “detecting” a 
priori truths in the world morally relevant. It 
is such an a priori truth, that it is not more 
likely for Linda to be a bank teller and a fem-
inist than it is for her to be a bank teller. So, 
the rationalist may believe that type 2 pro-
cesses are “good,” because they do the job of 
applying some a priori knowledge to the 
world. However, sentimentalists do not share 
such a commitment. After all, if emotions are 
Emotions, Experiments and the Moral Brain 
 
23 
the source of moral knowledge, this knowledge 
is presumably a posteriori. The unintentional 
strategy that has been tacitly employed in the 
sourcing argument is to assume, through the 
use of  cherrypicked situations and tasks, a 
normative criterion. In these cases, the cor-
rectness of mathematics or logic seems self-
evident, thus a principle favoring behaviors 
indicating the mathematically or logically cor-
rect solution is trivially applicable in these cas-
es. This hides the fact that all that has been 
shown is that these processes are better at do-
ing a specific job and are only better processes 
in virtue of the assumption of principles pro-
claiming this to be the relevant job – a princi-
ple that is rationalistic in nature. 
 
█  The Circularity of Sourcing Arguments 
 
As has been illustrated in the paragraphs 
above, the reliability of cognitive processes has 
been established on the basis of a rationalistic 
principle: a principle C saying, that, for all sit-
uations in domain D, if a desired response (in 
these cases that responses in accordance with 
mathematics and logic) is achieved by P, then 
P is a reliable source of insight. So premise (I*) 
can be restated as follows: 
 
(I**) As established through behavioral 
principle C, in domain D, if psycholog-
ical process T1 (automatic-emotional 
thinking) is the source of insight, then 
this insight is unreliable and if psycho-
logical process T2 (controlled-rational 
thinking) is the source of insight, then 
this insight is reliable. 
 
While the last section showed the struc-
ture of sourcing arguments to be circular, it is 
worth discussing how such sourcing argu-
ments can be employed against various posi-
tions. Based on the clarifications developed 
in the last sections, Greene’s sourcing argu-
ment can be stated as follows: 
 
(i) As established by principle C, in domain 
D, if psychological process T1 (type 1 
automatic-emotional thinking) is the 
source of insight, then this insight is un-
reliable and if psychological process T2 
(type 2 controlled-rational thinking) is 
the source of insight, then this insight is 
reliable. 
(ii) Intuition I1 supporting deontology is 
sourced from T1. 
(iii) Intuition I2 supporting utilitarianism is 
sourced from T2. 
(iv) The intuitions in question are elicited in 
domain D. 
(v) Thus, from (i), (ii) and (iv) it can be 
concluded that intuition I2 supporting 
utilitarianism is reliable and should be 
trusted. From (i), (iii) and (iv) it can be 
concluded that intuition I1 supporting 
deontology is unreliable and can be dis-
counted. 
 
The objection this paper is committed to 
is that sourcing arguments boil down to cir-
cular claims. The sourcing argument is em-
ployed to settle normative debates; that one 
normative principle is preferable over anoth-
er. However, premise (i) already presupposes 
such a conclusion, since a specific kind of 
normative principle is employed. As has been 
argued above, in the process of imposing 
normative characteristics on a cognitive pro-
cess it is presupposed which facts or infor-
mation are morally relevant (see Section 4). 
To make such a determination, however, is 
precisely what moral theories usually offer. 
To conclude that one moral theory is superi-
or to another is also to accept the assertion 
the theory makes about which information is 
morally relevant.  
Consider the following polemic formula-
tion of the argument, which is intended to 
highlight the critical flaws of the argument: 
 
1. Morally relevant information is only con-
tained in the logical or mathematical fea-
tures of the world.27 
2. Emotions (or more generally affective 
processes) are sensitive to non-logical and 
non-mathematical features of the world. 
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3. Moral intuitions relying on emotional 
processes lack moral validity, as the pro-
cesses that produce them are not sensitive 
to morally relevant information. 
4. Normative theory M is based on intui-
tions relying on emotional processes. 
5. Thus, normative theory M, holding non-
logical or non-mathematical features of 
the world to be morally relevant, lacks 
morally valid support and should there-
fore be rejected. 
 
Through premise (1) a normative com-
mitment in favor or moral rationalism is 
made. Thus, premise (1) already presupposes 
the falseness of theory M, qua this theory 
holding different factors to be morally rele-
vant than those assumed to be the correct 
ones. Thus, such an argument is circular if 
employed against theories holding other fea-
tures to be relevant than those assumed in 
premise (1). One significant aspect of the de-
bate that this sourcing argument purports to 
settle is which information is morally rele-
vant. Utilitarians tend to view moral prob-
lems as calculable and it is hardly surprising 
that cognitive processes sensitive to mathe-
matically relevant information will produce 
moral thought that is in line with utilitarian 
considerations. 
Other normative theories, however, at-
tribute no significance to how many people 
are affected by a decision. Deontology, for ex-
ample, assigns critical importance to whether 
persons are used as mere means, irrespective 
of the amount of harm potentially avoided by 
using them. Such considerations presumably 
stem from other cognitive processes. A deon-
tologist should thus not agree that the math-
ematical features of the world are the bearers 
of morally relevant information. It is some-
what ironic should a deontologist not agree to 
a rationalistic criterion, as the father of deon-
tology, Immanuel Kant, is considered a ra-
tionalist par excellence. But this may simply be 
the wrong flavor of rationalism. 
The more intriguing possibility, that de-
ontology may not be as rational a theory as it 
purports itself to be, will be developed in the 
next section, in the context of another species 
of arguments in moral cognition. 
However, whether a sourcing argument is 
spelled out to assail moral sentimentalism, or 
defend utilitarianism or rationalism is of no 
consequence, all these claims are in the end 
circular. A principle built on the truth of 
mathematics or logic is essentially rational-
istic. Hence, it will likely exclude conclusions 
favoring moral sentimentalism. In the previ-
ous passages, the formulation of Greene’s 
claim was more explicitly directed at his main 
interest, the debate between deontology and 
utilitarianism. As his argument is taken to be 
a problem for moral sentimentalists I will be 
spelled out as such once: 
 
(i) As established by a rationalistic behav-
ioral principle, in domain D, if psycho-
logical process T1 (type 1 automatic-
emotional thinking) is the source of in-
sight, then this insight is unreliable. 
(ii) Intuition I, picking up on factors 
deemed relevant by moral sentimental-
ists and thus supporting moral senti-
mentalism, is sourced from T1. 
(iii) The intuitions in question are elicited in 
domain D. 
(iv) Thus, it can be concluded that intuitions 
supporting moral sentimentalism are 
unreliable and can be discounted ac-
cording to a rationalistic principle. 
 
As far as we can treat rationalism as an 
antithesis to moral sentimentalism, this ar-
gument is circular. Rationalism is assumed to 
be true in premise (i) and thus the conclusion 
that the antithesis is false, is a circular claim. 
However, there are a number of positions 
that may present a partial synthesis of ra-
tionalism and sentimentalism, as such this 
formulation of the argument may not cap-
ture them adequately. However, what is 
meant here with rationalism is almost cer-
tainly that the truths of morality are akin or 
similar to the truths of mathematics and log-
ic. A claim which, I believe, is almost univer-
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sally a problem for sentimentalists – I take it 
as somewhat obvious that emotions cannot 
be trusted to produce mathematically or logi-
cally correct responses. If a “good” brain pro-
cess is one that produces “right” responses 
according to the principles of mathematics 
and logic, then moral sentimentalism is as-
sumed to be false to begin with. And as this 
appears to be a premise of Greene’s argu-
ment, it cannot be applied to conclude the 
falseness of moral sentimentalism. 
 
█  Debunking without sourcing 
   
The considerations advanced here should 
not be misunderstood as a criticism of moral 
cognition research or experimental philoso-
phy in general, which are in many instances 
very promising research endeavors. They do, 
however, fail to provide a non-circular argu-
ment against moral sentimentalism proper. 
Nevertheless, specific sentimentalist posi-
tions may  fall prey to experimental insights. 
One of the problems with the work in 
moral cognition is that arguments bleed into 
each other. In contrast to many sourcing ar-
guments, debunking arguments can be con-
structed in a non-circular way; though ele-
ments of the sourcing argument are some-
times implicitly assumed to be part of these 
arguments, without actually including them. 
Therefore, ostensibly implying the falseness 
of moral sentimentalism, but not doing the 
required argumentative work. The most 
common way to clarify (one of) Greene’s ar-
gument(s) is to cash out the experimental da-
ta he provides in the following form:28  
 
1. Deontology holds factor X to be morally 
relevant. 
2. Moral agents’ preferential support for ac-
tions in accordance with deontology are 
caused by the agents picking up on factor X. 
3. Experimental data shows that factor X is 
actually irrelevant for the intuition, which is 
elicited by factor Y. 
4. Factor Y is not held to be morally relevant 
by Deontology. 
5. Thus, moral agents’ preferential support of 
deontology has been debunked. 
 
This is both a valid argument and is not 
vulnerable to the circularity objection dis-
cussed before. This argument does not rely 
on externally imposing a normative criterion 
on a cognitive process, it relies on a moral 
theory stipulating certain factors to be rele-
vant and then experimentally revealing that 
these factors do not play the role they are 
supposed to be playing. This means that the 
theory makes assertions about moral cogniz-
ing which are inconsistent with experimental 
evidence giving insight into these cognitive 
processes. 
Based on this analysis, I will label this spe-
cies of debunking arguments inconsistency 
arguments. For example, one could construct 
an argument against deontology on the basis 
of Kant’s rejection of emotional experience 
as a morally relevant factor. A deontologist 
joining Kant in this commitment may right-
fully be troubled by the experimental evi-
dence that emotions seem to play a critical 
role in moral cognition in general or the role 
of emotions in eliciting characteristically de-
ontological intuitions. Such a rationalistic 
commitment is inconsistent with the experi-
mental insights. However, this should not be 
taken to mean that the position of moral sen-
timentalism is in any kind of trouble. 
Though it appears to be a common theme 
that cognitive processes do pick up on factors 
not endorsed by moral theories and these 
cognitive processes are often asserted to be 
emotional processes, it seems somewhat un-
clear whether this is a problem for moral sen-
timentalism. First of all there is the concep-
tual question of whether these processes ac-
tually should be considered emotional or 
moral emotions proper, and second the ques-
tion of whether the factors they pick up on 
are truly morally irrelevant.29 
Inconsistency arguments have a more lim-
ited argumentative force than the sourcing 
argument discussed in the beginning. While 
these arguments are more defensible and do 
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a reasonable job of attacking specific moral 
doctrines, e.g., deontology, they provide little 
reason to doubt moral sentimentalism. While 
a rationalist may be troubled by the associa-
tion of their moral intuitions with emotional 
processes, this certainly is not a surprise or 
worry to a sentimentalist.  
 
█  The best of both worlds (or how some 
moral cognition arguments may have lim-
ited force against moral sentimentalism) 
  
The presumably most impactful argu-
ments emanating from moral cognition re-
search on the field of moral sentimentalism 
will be a species of inconsistency arguments, 
which experimentally reveal the nature of 
emotional moral processing to be contrary to 
philosophical assumptions. Moral sentimen-
talism has to provide conceptions of emo-
tions that make their claim that emotions 
pick up on morally relevant factors plausible. 
As emotions are some sort of mental process, 
emotion theorists have to make empirical as-
sertions, which are subject to experimental 
investigation. One of the substantial insights 
of Greene’s work appears to be that emo-
tional moral responses are bound to sensory-
motor programs sensitive to context. Greene 
and colleagues write: «In a general sense, this 
suggests a mechanism of moral judgment 
that is a species of embodied cognition».30 
This conclusion is based Greene’s work pre-
viously discussed, but draws more specifically 
on the empirical insights gained therein.  
One much discussed factor that influ-
ences agents’ judgements but is not prima fa-
cie endorsed by moral theory (i.e., deontolo-
gy), can be precisely isolated in different var-
iations of the footbridge dilemma. Deontolo-
gists hold that the footbridge dilemma elicits 
a characteristically deontological response, 
i.e., not pushing the fat man to save the oth-
ers, because they would not use a single per-
son to save the other, i.e., using a person as a 
means to an end. This explanation would al-
so account for agents’ willingness to push the 
lever in the original case, as the person sacri-
ficed there is not used as a means to save the 
other potential victims. Greene and col-
leagues find that this is, however, not the rel-
evant factor that people respond to. If, for 
example, the fat man is dropped onto the 
track not by pushing, but by a trap-door 
connected to a mechanism that is triggered 
by a lever, then subjects tended to be much 
more willing to sacrifice the fat man, even 
though this still meant using the fat man to 
save the others. 
The embodied factor that Greene and 
colleagues identified as relevant is called per-
sonal force.31 The intuitions thought to sup-
port deontology, because it is elicited in a sit-
uation where a person is used as a mere 
means to an end, actually pick up on a fairly 
direct bodily interaction towards another 
person (experiments support that this is both 
the case for pushing with one’s hands and us-
ing a pole). As it turns out, what a subject’s 
decisions depend on is whether they have to 
execute specific movement patterns. Pulling 
a lever is unproblematic for subjects, while 
shoving or pushing motions are problemat-
ic.32 The issue that these experiments raise is 
that this seems to be a morally irrelevant fac-
tor, not in the sense that personal force is 
morally acceptable, but that this is not a suit-
able criterion for differentiating between 
morally acceptable and unacceptable behav-
ior; if someone takes action to harm another 
human, it should not depend on the manner 
in which this harm is inflicted whether this is 
acceptable or not.  
The issue for moral sentimentalists arises 
from the putative connection between emo-
tional reactions and these embodied personal 
force judgements. Given the cases which 
Greene investigates such a link is reasonable 
to conclude. While, he appears to absorb em-
bodied aspects of cognition into the fast-
automatic portion of his dual-process moral 
brain, usually embodiment theorists would 
not restrict their claims about the embodied 
nature of the mind to affective phenomena. 
However, the connection between emotions 
and embodiment cognitive processes itself is 
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plausible given a number of recent works as-
serting similar claims.33 This connection is 
problematic, because an embodied (or maybe 
even more generally situated) system under-
lying moral judgements may have some trou-
bling implications. Wilson and Foglia define 
embodied cognition as follows:  
 
Embodiment thesis: Many features of cogni-
tion are embodied in that they are deeply 
dependent upon characteristics of the phys-
ical body of an agent, such that the agent’s 
beyond-the-brain body plays a significant 
causal role, or a physically constitutive role, 
in that agent’s cognitive processing.34 
 
In light of Greene and colleagues’ insights 
this can be adapted to an Embodied Moral 
Cognition Thesis (EMCT):  
 
Many features of moral cognition (especial-
ly emotional ones) are dependent upon 
characteristics of the physical body of an 
agent. 
 
EMCT implies that emotional moral re-
sponses are not only relative to one agent’s 
beliefs about the world, but to the bodily 
changes they experience. This specific form 
of subjectivism – grounded in an agent’s 
body – may for some sentimentalist be the 
proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s 
back. An inconsistency argument is easily 
constructed: 
 
• Theory S holds emotions to be morally rele-
vant, because they rely on non-embodied 
factors X, Y, or, Z (e.g., on them being relat-
ed to beliefs, language, etc.), which make 
emotions sensitive to morally relevant states 
of affair. 
• Emotional process E is causally responsible 
for responses to certain moral problems. 
• Experimental evidence suggests that process 
E actually relies on embodied motor pat-
terns, that are not a suitable cognitive vehi-
cle for factors X, Y, and Z. 
• Thus, theory S defending the moral signifi-
cance of emotions on the grounds that they 
rely on factors X, Y, or Z has been de-
bunked. 
 
Such a debunking argument is only appli-
cable to a theory of (moral) emotions stipu-
lating non-embodied factors as constitutive 
for (moral) emotions. EMCT strongly sug-
gests certain meta-ethical conclusions, for 
example, that emotional moral thought does 
not resemble language, refer to beliefs, etc., 
but moral thought relies on (learned) senso-
ry-motor patterns. Whether this has mean-
ingful implications depends on the concrete 
concepts of cognitive processes in question. 
Traditionally, mental mechanics are con-
ceived of as relying on their representational 
content about the world. But if the mental 
processes in question are sensory-motor pat-
terns and presumably lack propositional rep-
resentational content; traditional concep-
tions of moral thought, belief, and language, 
as well as moral theories relying on such con-
ceptions, are called into question.35 
It is common to conceptualize moral 
terms by the standards of universality, impar-
tiality or objectivity. After all, they are sup-
posed to be not only meaningful to the agents 
experiencing or expressing them, they should 
apply to all moral agents. Cognitivists tend to 
account for this by conceptualizing cognitive 
processes as being representational of true 
moral concepts existing in the world, refer-
enced by all moral agents. The loss of repre-
sentational content as a conceptual tool to 
account for these desiderata leaves a gap in 
many theories that needs to be closed. This 
will either require some sort of moral bridg-
ing principle that connects the bodily specific 
sensory-motor patterns to impartial, univer-
salizable moral principle, or the abandon-
ment of such principles. 
To abandon such principles may not be 
farfetched, as a growing number of ethicists 
appear to move away from these principles 
and towards a more relational approach to 
ethics,36 which may match up well with these 
cognitive insights. 
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This embodiment issue is not new to moral 
sentimentalists and emotion theorists, but still 
a contentious one. Embodied emotion theses 
have been around for a long time, e.g., the 
James-Lange-Theory, which construe emotions 
to be feelings of bodily change. Embodied (or 
situated) theories of emotions are historically 
the default positions.37 But James-Lange in-
spired theories have been criticized for failing 
to account for the intentional content of emo-
tions.38 Meaningful moral emotions especially 
rely on their intentional content. Non-
intentionality would invalidate moral senti-
mentalism, as emotions would motivate behav-
ior in the world without meaningfully being 
about what actually happens in the world.  
In the history of the philosophical study 
of emotions, this led to the advent of cogni-
tivist theories of emotion. Theorists dis-
tanced themselves, or have been understood 
as distancing themselves, from the embodied 
aspects of emotions and reconceptualized 
emotions as cognitive processes, which carry 
intentional content in virtue of their repre-
sentational content of the world. Authors 
conceived of emotions as judgements,39 e.g., 
that fear is the judgement that something is 
dangerous. This tendency to reconceptualize 
emotions extended to the study of moral 
emotions, where moral-cognitivists concep-
tualize emotions as emotional judgements 
that contain, refer to or resemble moral be-
liefs or moral statements. These positions are 
prima facie inconsistent with embodied con-
ceptions of (moral) emotions, as emotional 
responses (which would be labeled as judge-
ments in these views) are based on sensory 
motor-patterns and thus would not contain, 
refer to or resemble moral beliefs or moral 
statements. Such views would need to be de-
fended against such an EMCT argument. 
But cognitivist conceptions of emotion have 
already fallen somewhat out of favor, based on 
the general evidence from cognitive science, 
that cognitive processes and emotions actually 
are in many ways embodied. And as Prinz40 
points out, the embodiment of emotions is not 
actually inconsistent with them being inten-
tional. Increasingly, current theorists account 
for them as such, resolving the tension between 
intentionality and embodiment.41 
Moral sentimentalist positions that are 
untroubled by the EMCT thesis are also easy 
enough to find. Most prominently Jesse Prinz 
advanced a theory of emotion and morality.42 
This theory strongly emphasizes embodied 
aspects of emotions and the moral signifi-
cance of emotions. Furthermore, Colombetti 
and Torrance43 provide a more substantial 
sketch of a primarily situated, i.e., enactivist, 
theory of morality, which is compatible with 
moral sentimentalism. Urban44 advances this 
line of thought to connect enactivist ethics 
with care ethics, a modern variant of rela-
tional ethics. The connection to care ethics is 
especially appealing because as opposed to 
the comparatively ancient theories usually 
invoked in moral cognition debates, care-
ethics emerged from early psychological en-
quiries into morality.45 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
The question investigated in the paper is 
whether moral cognition research is a threat 
to the position of moral sentimentalism. 
While this appears to be a somewhat com-
mon worry (or hope), it is not the case. De-
bunking arguments that aim to invalidate 
moral sentimentalism fall into two categories 
of arguments: sourcing arguments, i.e., de-
bunking intuitions by reference to the neu-
ropsychological source of the argument, or 
inconsistency arguments, i.e., invalidating 
intuitions by showing an experimentally re-
vealed inconsistency between such intuitions 
and the empirical commitments of a theory. 
In the first part of this paper, sourcing ar-
guments against moral sentimentalism were 
revealed to be circular and thus not a valid 
form of argument. Sourcing arguments em-
ploy an implicit normative first principle to 
establish the neuropsychological source of an 
intuition as “good” or “bad.” However, this 
principle, in turn, becomes the object of exper-
imental investigation. The principle is con-
Emotions, Experiments and the Moral Brain 
 
29 
firmed (with some obfuscation) by showing 
that intuitions supporting this principle have a 
“good” source and intuitions supporting other 
principles have a “bad” source. This, however, 
is circular, because the principle established 
which source is “good” and “bad” in the first 
place, and thus the truth of the tacitly as-
sumed principle, depends on the conclusion of 
the argument. To put it bluntly, this argument 
claims that moral sentimentalism is wrong be-
cause emotions rely on unreliable cognitive 
processes, but the unreliability has been estab-
lished on rationalistic grounds, i.e., consider-
ing an emotional response to be unreliable in 
the first place. Without the argumentative 
force of sourcing arguments, moral cognition 
research appears toothless in its attacks on 
moral sentimentalism, though not irrelevant 
for moral sentimentalist. 
The other species of debunking argu-
ments, i.e., inconsistency arguments, are an 
interesting addition to the debate. Moral sen-
timentalists have to make certain empirical 
stipulations about the nature of emotions, 
which supply some form of cognitive contri-
bution to moral cognizing but still mainly rely 
on the tools of philosophical intuitionism to 
defend their theories. It is an argument worth 
making as it shows that these concrete empiri-
cal stipulations are inconsistent with the ex-
perimentally investigated intuitions ostensibly 
supporting the same position. This has often 
been cashed out in the form of arguments 
against deontology, which somewhat misses 
the mark. While the presence of emotional 
factors in moral cognition is a problem for 
(some) deontologists, it is certainly not a prob-
lem for sentimentalists. Moral sentimentalism 
is supported by experimental evidence that 
shows emotions play a crucial role in moral 
cognizing; after all, sentimentalists usually as-
sume this to be the case anyway. 
However, the specifics of experimental evi-
dence accumulated may not make all sentimen-
talists equally happy. As Greene and colleagues 
show,46 there is persuasive evidence that moral 
cognition (and likely emotional processes espe-
cially) rely on a form of embodied cognition. 
The involvement of the body in moral emo-
tions has been objected to, in the philosophical 
debate about the nature of emotions, on the 
grounds that this may preclude the intentional-
ity of emotions. However, many modern con-
ceptions of emotions treat the embodiment 
and intentionality of emotions as compatible. 
Accordingly, there are sentimentalist positions 
that are consistent with experimental evidence 
suggesting the embodiment of emotions. Con-
sequently, research from moral cognition is not 
a threat to moral sentimentalism, but a wel-
come empirical source of information that en-
riches and substantiates the debate. 
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